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CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE DHDP AND EGDP PROTOCOLS
OVER E
(m)
p
KARAN KHATHURIA, GIACOMO MICHELI, AND VIOLETTA WEGER
Abstract. In this paper we break the protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman De-
composition problem and ElGamal Decomposition problem over the matrix ring
E
(m)
p . Our attack terminates in a provable running time of O(m
10).
1. Introduction
Public key cryptosystems are often based on number theoretical problems, such as
integer factorization as in RSA [1] or the discrete logarithm problem over finite fields
or over elliptic curves. The latter is the base for wellknown protocols, as the ElGamal
protocol [2] or the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [3]. Increasing computing
powers threatens these classical cryptographic schemes and new ambient spaces are
demanded, for example involving noncommutative structures (see [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]). In
nonabelian groups there are two main problems which give raise to cryptographic
schemes; the semigroup action problem (SAP) [9], and the decomposition problem
(DP). For an overview see [10, 11]. These two problems are very similar: in the
SAP one is given a finite semigroup S acting on a finite set A, for x, y ∈ A, such
that there exists an s ∈ S with y = sx, one wants to find t ∈ S, such that y = tx.
Whereas in the DP one is given a nonabelian group G, (x, y) ∈ G×G and S ⊂ G,
one wants to find z1, z2 ∈ S, such that y = z1xz2.
Based on these two problems J.J. Climent and J.A. Lo´pez-Ramos proposed three
protocols in [12] over a special ring of matrices involving operations modulo different
powers of the same prime, called E
(m)
p . Similar cryptosystems can be found in [13,
Example 4.3.c]. This ring is a generalization of the ring Ep, Climent, Navarro
and Tartosa introduced in [14]. The first cryptographic scheme based on Ep [15],
was broken in [16]. This attack can be prevented by admitting only few invertible
elements, as it is the case in the ring E
(m)
p [17, Corollary 1]. In addition, another
nice property of such rings is that they do not admit embeddings into matrix rings
over a field (see [18]), which is often the main problem of cryptographic schemes over
matrix rings (see for example [19]) and it prevents a reduction to small extensions
of finite fields as in [20].
The first protocol proposed in [12] based on the semigroup action problem over the
ring E
(m)
p was broken by Micheli and Weger in [21] using a solution sieve argument.
In this paper we break the remaining two protocols proposed by Climent and Lo´pez-
Ramos in [12] both are based on the decomposition problem over E
(m)
p and happen to
be equivalent. They will be denoted by the Diffie-Hellman Decomposition Problem
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(DHDP) and the ElGamal Decomposition Problem (EGDP). For this we will also
rely on a similar solution sieve argument as in [21].
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we recall the definitions and
properties of the ring E
(m)
p and state the DHDP and EGDP protocols over E
(m)
p . In
Section 3 we present the practical attack on the DHDP protocol, which in turn will
also break the equivalent EGDP protocol. In Subsection 3.1 we show in an example
how the attack works. In Subsection 3.2 we break the scheme for many practical
instances of the protocol and see how the actual running time of the attack compares
with the predicted one. The code we used is available at https://www.math.uzh.
ch/aa/uploads/media/DHDP_attack.
1.1. Notation. Let T be a subset of a (possibly non-commutative) ring S. We will
denote the centralizer of T by
Cen(T ) = {U ∈ S | UR = RU ∀ R ∈ T}.
When T = S, then Cen(S) is said to be the center of S and will be denoted by
Z(S). Let N denote the natural numbers, i.e. N = {1, 2, . . .} and N0 = N∪ {0}. For
any commutative ring R, and any two positive integers k,m ∈ N we will denote by
Matk×m(R) the set of k by m matrices with coefficients in R. If M is an abelian
group and R is a ring acting on M , we denote by EndR(M) the set of endomorphisms
of M as an R-module. Notice that EndR(M) has a natural ring structure. Let
φ ∈ EndR(M), we denote by R[φ] the smallest subring of EndR(M) which contains
R and φ.
2. Cryptography over E
(m)
p
Let us recall the definition of the matrix ring E
(m)
p and its center, which were first
introduced in [17, Theorem 1].
Definition 1. Let E
(m)
p be the following set of matrices.
E(m)p =
{
(aij)i,j∈{1,...m} | aij ∈ Z/piZ if i ≤ j, and aij ∈ pi−jZ/piZ if i > j
}
.
To shorten the notation we will write [aij ] = (aij)i,j∈{1,...m}. This set forms a ring
with the addition and multiplication defined, respectively, as follows
[aij ] + [bij ] =
[
(aij + bij) mod p
i
]
,
[aij ] · [bij ] =
[(
m∑
k=1
aikbkj
)
mod pi
]
.
Let us denote by V the set Z/pZ× · · · ×Z/pmZ. The ring E(m)p acts on V by the
usual matrix multiplication.
Theorem 2. [12, Theorem 2] The center Z
(
E
(m)
p
)
of E
(m)
p is given by the set[aij ] ∈ E(m)p ∣∣ aii =
i−1∑
j=0
pjuj , with uj ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} and aij = 0 if i 6= j
 .
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For M ∈ E(m)p , let us denote by Cen(M) the centralizer of M , i.e. the set of
elements X ∈ E(m)p , such that XM = MX. Define the set
H(M) =
{
k∑
i=0
CiM
i
∣∣ Ci ∈ Z(E(m)p ), k ∈ N
}
.
Let us recall the Diffie-Hellman decomposition problem, proposed in [11, Example
3].
Definition 3 (DH Decomposition Problem (DHDP)). LetG be a semigroup, A,B ⊆
G two subsemigroups such that ab = ba for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B and assume that
x ∈ G. Given two elements a1xa2 and b1xb2, with a1, a2 ∈ A and b1, b2 ∈ B, find
the element a1b1xb2a2.
In [12], Climent and Lo´pez-Ramos proposed two protocols based on the decom-
position problem over E
(m)
p , one of the protocols is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
and the other one is an ElGamal protocol, both analogous to the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [3] and the ElGamal crypotosystem [2] respectively.
Protocol 4 (DHDP protocol). Alice and Bob agree on two public elements M,X ∈
E
(m)
p such that M /∈ Cen(X).
1. Alice chooses A1, A2 ∈ H(M) and sends GA = A1XA2 to Bob.
2. Bob chooses B1, B2 ∈ Cen(M) such that B1X 6= XB2 and sends GB =
B1XB2 to Alice.
3. Alice computes A1GBA2.
4. Bob computes B1GAB2.
Since Ai and Bi commute for all i ∈ {1, 2}, it is clear that Alice and Bob share a
common value.
Protocol 5 (EGDP protocol). Alice and Bob agree on a public element M ∈ E(m)p .
Let S ∈ E(m)p be the secret that Bob wants to send Alice.
1. Alice chooses N ∈ E(m)p such that NM 6= MN and two elements A1, A2 ∈
H(M) and publishes her public key (N,A1NA2).
2. Bob chooses randomly two elements B1, B2 ∈ Cen(M) and sends (F,D) =
(B1NB2, S +B1A1NA2B2) to Alice.
3. Alice recovers S by computing D −A1FA2.
Since Ai and Bi commute for all i ∈ {1, 2} we have that
D −A1FA2 = S +B1A1NA2B2 −A1B1NB2A2 = S.
As observed in [12, Theorem 4], breaking the EGDP protocol is equivalent to
breaking the DHDP protocol.
3. The attack
In this section we provide an algorithm to break the DHDP protocol over the
ring E
(m)
p . As mentioned in Protocol 4 and Protocol 5, the two subgroups used are
H(M) and Cen(M) for a publicly known M ∈ E(m)p .
Lemma 6. The center of the ring E
(m)
p is isomorphic to Z/pmZ as rings.
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Proof. It is easy to see that the following map is a ring isomorphism
ψ : Z/pmZ → Z(E(m)p )
z 7→ [aij ],
where aii = z mod p
i and aij = 0 for i 6= j. 
A direct generalization of Theorem 5 in [22] shows that if one looks at Z/pZ ×
· · ·×Z/pmZ as a Z-module, then E(m)p is isomorphic to EndZ(Z/pZ×· · ·×Z/pmZ).
Using this fact and the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem, we can prove that the subring
generated by a matrix in E
(m)
p is a finite dimensional Z-module. To see this in detail,
let us now recall the general statement of Cayley-Hamilton Theorem.
Theorem 7. [23, Proposition 2.4] Let R be a ring, let M be a finitely generated
R-module, let φ : M → M be a module morphism and let I ⊂ R be an ideal of R,
such that φ(M) ⊆ IM . Let n ∈ N be the number of elements needed to generate M .
Then there exist an−1, . . . , a0 ∈ I, such that
φn + an−1φn−1 + · · · a0 = 0.
We now prove the corollary we are interested in.
Corollary 8. For every A ∈ E(m)p , there exists a0, . . . , am−1 ∈ Z, such that
Am = a0 + a1A+ · · · am−1Am−1.
Proof. In Theorem 7, set I = R = Z and M = Z/pZ × · · · × Z/pmZ, hence n = m
and φ a matrix in E
(m)
p . It follows now immediately that Z[φ] has dimension less
than or equal to m (as a Z-module). 
Remark 9. Notice that in the statement and the proof of Corollary 8, Z could as
well be replaced by Z/pmZ since any element in pmZ acts as the zero morphism over
M .
Lemma 10. Let M ∈ E(m)p . Then the map ψ : (Z/pmZ) [x] → H(M) given by
ψ(f(x)) = f(M) is a surjective Z/pmZ-algebra homomorphism.
Proof. First, one should observe that thanks to Lemma 6 one can identify the center
of E
(m)
p with Z/pmZ, from which it follows that the map is well defined. To see that
ψ is a surjective homomorphism, it is enough to look at E
(m)
p as EndZ/pmZ(Z/pZ×
· · ·×Z/pmZ) and to notice that H(M) ∼= (Z/pmZ)[M ]: in fact, using Lemma 6, there
exist u0, . . . , uk ∈ Z/pmZ such that each Ci’s of a matrix in H(M) can be written
as the diagonal matrix with entries (ui mod p, ui mod p
2, . . . , ui mod p
m).

Proposition 11. Let M,X ∈ E(m)p and GA = A1XA2 for some A1, A2 ∈ H(M).
Then there exists λ11, λ12, . . . , λmm ∈ Z/pmZ such that GA =
∑m−1
i,j=0 λijM
iXM j.
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Proof. Combining Lemma 10 and Corollary 8, we can write A1 =
∑m−1
i=0 uiM
i and
A2 =
∑m−1
i=0 viM
i for some u0, . . . , um−1, v0, . . . , vm−1 ∈ Z/pmZ. Then
GA = A1XA2
=
(
m−1∑
i=0
uiM
i
)
X
m−1∑
j=0
vjM
j

=
m−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j=0
uivjM
iXM j
=
m−1∑
i=0
m−1∑
j=0
λijM
iXM j ,
for λij = uivj . 
We use the following lemma in order to solve a system of linear equations over
Z/piZ, which was presented in [21].
Lemma 12 (Lemma 14, [21]). Let R = Z/piZ for some i ∈ N. Let B ∈ Mat`×h(R)
with ` ≤ h, and c ∈ R`. The set of solutions of
(3.1) Bµ = c
is either empty or there exists an h × h matrix P such that all solutions have the
form
{µ¯+ Pλ | λ ∈ Rh}.
Also, P and µ¯ can be found in polynomial time.
Now we are ready for the main result.
Theorem 13. DHDP protocol over E
(m)
p can be broken in polynomial time.
Proof. Let M,X ∈ E(m)p such that MX 6= XM , and let A1, A2 ∈ H(M) and
B1, B2 ∈ Cen(M). Given M,X,GA = A1XA2 and GB = B1XB2, we have to find
A1GBA2.
Using Proposition 11, we know that there exist λ11, . . . , λmm ∈ Z/pmZ such that
GA =
∑m−1
i,j=0 λijM
iXM j . We use Lemma 12 to solve this system of linear equations
for λ11, λ12 . . . , λmm. Then the exchanged secret is given by
m−1∑
i,j=0
λijM
iGBM
j =
m−1∑
i,j=0
λijM
iB1XB2M
j
=
m−1∑
i,j=0
λijB1M
iXM jB2
= B1
m−1∑
i,j=0
λijM
iXM j
B2
= A1GBA2 = B1GAB2
Algorithm 1 provides a formal way to solve the DHDP protocol over E
(m)
p .

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Algorithm 1 Break protocol based on DHDP over E
(m)
p
Input: M,X,GA, GB ∈ E(m)p
Output: the exchanged secret A1GBA2 ∈ E(m)p
1: Construct the matrix of linear equations arising from A1XA2 = GA using Propo-
sition 11, given by
C =
m∑
i,j=1
λijM
iXM j
2: Partition the congruences according to their moduli obtaining the equations
(i) A(i)λ ≡ gi mod pi,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
3: S ← Idm2
4: λ¯← 0
5: i← 0
6: while i ≤ m− 1 do
7: In the equation (m− i) replace λ with λ¯+ Sµ
8: Apply Lemma 12 to solve this system, i.e. h = m2,R = Z/pm−iZ, B =
A(m−i)S and c = gm−i − A(m−i)λ¯, getting the particular solution µ¯ and the
kernel matrix T .
9: S ← ST
10: λ¯← λ¯+ Sµ¯
11: i← i+ 1
12: Return
∑m
i,j=1 λ¯ijM
iGBM
j
Remark 14. Observe that, in the proof of Theorem 13, Lemma 12 is applied after
partitioning the congruences according to their moduli. Applied on the congruences
modulo pn, it ensures the existence of a particular solution and a kernel matrix over
Z/pnZ. Using this data and the data of the congruences modulo pn−1 we obtain a
new set of solutions, which now solves the congruences modulo pn−1 and modulo pn.
Iterating this procedure we get the final set of solutions (all equivalent to break the
scheme), exactly as in the proof of [21, Proposition 15].
Running time. Let us analyse the running time of Algorithm 1. Observe that
in the i-th step we apply Lemma 12 to an m×m2 matrix. By the running time of
Lemma 12 we have O((m2)4) Z/p(m−i)Z-operations (which is O(m9) bit operations)
in the i-th step. Since we repeat this step m times, we get that to run Algorithm 1
we need O(m10) bit operations.
3.1. A 2× 2 example. Let m = 2, p = 2 and let M =
[
1 1
0 2
]
and X =
[
1 1
2 1
]
be
public elements.
Alice chooses
A1 =
[
0 1
0 3
]
A2 =
[
1 1
0 2
]
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and publishes GA =
[
0 0
2 0
]
. Bob chooses
B1 =
[
0 1
0 3
]
B2 =
[
0 1
0 1
]
and publishes GB =
[
0 1
0 1
]
. The shared secret is then
A1GBA2 = B1GAB2 =
[
0 2
0 2
]
.
The attacker sees only
M =
[
1 1
0 2
]
, X =
[
1 1
2 1
]
, GA =
[
0 0
2 0
]
, GB =
[
0 1
0 1
]
,
and wants to find A1GBA2 ∈ E(2)2 .
In Step 1 of Algorithm 1, the attacker constructs
C =
m∑
i,j=1
λijM
iXM j =
[
λ11 + λ12 + 3λ21 + 3λ22 λ11 + 3λ12 + 2λ21 + 3λ22
2λ11 + 2λ12 λ11 + 2λ21
]
.
This partitions into the following system of equations
λ11 + λ12 + 3λ21 + 3λ22 ≡ 0 mod 2,
λ11 + 3λ12 + 2λ21 + 3λ22 ≡ 0 mod 2
and
2λ11 + 2λ12 ≡ 2 mod 4,
λ11 + 2λ21 ≡ 0 mod 4.
Setting
A(1) =
[
1 1 3 3
1 3 2 3
]
, g1 =
[
0
0
]
,
A(2) =
[
2 2 0 0
1 0 2 0
]
, g2 =
[
2
0
]
and
λ =

λ11
λ12
λ21
λ22
 ,
we get that the final system is
A(1)λ ≡ g1 mod 2,
A(2)λ ≡ g2 mod 4.
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m time (in hours)
32 0.062
36 0.197
40 0.537
44 1.145
48 2.394
52 6.368
56 16.532
60 28.990
Table 1. Running time (in hours) of the attack for p = 2 and dif-
ferent values for m.
As first step we want to solve with Lemma 12 the system A(2)λ ≡ g2 mod 4. We
obtain the following solution setλ¯+ Sµ
∣∣ µ ∈ Z4, S =

2 0 0 0
0 2 0 0
1 0 2 0
0 0 0 1
 and λ¯ =

0
3
0
0

 .
As second step we want to sieve the solutions. Hence we set in the new system
A(1)λ ≡ g1 mod 2 the solution of A(2)λ ≡ g2 mod 4 and get
A(1)Sµ ≡ g1 −A(1)λ¯ mod 2,
which is [
5 2 6 3
4 6 4 3
]
µ ≡
[−3
−9
]
mod 2.
Apply again Lemma 12 to find the particular solution µ¯ =

0
0
0
1
 and hence if we
define
λ¯← λ¯+ Sµ¯ =

0
3
0
1

we get the exchanged secret
A1GBA2 =
m∑
i,j=1
λ¯ijM
iGBM
j =
[
0 2
0 2
]
.
3.2. Implementation of the attack. In [17], Climent et. al. proposed to use the
DHDP protocol and EGDP protocol for the parameters p = 2 and m = 128. Table
1 shows the average running time in hours required to break the DHDP protocol
over E
(m)
p for p = 2 and different values for m, upto 60. The results of this table
were obtained by a MAGMA [24] implementation using a personal computer with
processor Intel Core 6C i7-8700K at 3.7 GHz and 64 GB RAM.
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Figure 1. log(time) vs log(m)
From the running time analysis, we expect the time to be O(m10). This implies
log(time) should be a linear function of log(m) having slope 10. In this experiment,
we observe that the plot of log(time) vs log(m) is linear with the slope 9.98 (see
Figure 1).
Notice that in Algorithm 1 solving a linear system over Z/piZ using Lemma 12
is the dominant part of the running time. This is done by transforming the matrix
representing the linear system into its Smith normal form. In our implementation we
used in-built MAGMA function to compute the Smith normal form, where Magma
[24] first uses the sparse techniques to reduce the input matrix to a dense submatrix.
Due to which the running time of the algorithm varies from instance to instance,
and hence we do not get the slope exactly equal to 10.
With regard to this implementation and the processor we used, it would take
around 1700 days to break the proposed parameters, that is p = 2 and m = 128.
The code we used is available at https://www.math.uzh.ch/aa/uploads/media/
DHDP_attack.
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